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[Vol. 72:661 of natural gas. Those costs may include everything from initial preparation 5 of the well site, drilling and casing, and fracturing, to restoration. These costs are significant, especially for horizontal wells designed to produce gas from the Marcellus Shale formation. As a result, the lessee/producer bears not only all of the costs of drilling a well, but also all of the risk that the well will not produce or be profitable. 6 If a well produces, that production occurs at the wellhead. From there, it is transported to points of sale downstream. Although the gas theoretically could be sold at the wellhead, typically it is not. In between the well head and the point of sale numerous activities may be undertaken to make the gas saleable, or saleable at a higher price, and those activities have costs. These potential costs include: the cost to process or dehydrate the gas, the cost to compress and transport the gas, and costs to market and sell the gas. 7 In other states, how these costs are treated for purposes of calculating royalties varies. However, two distinct approaches have developed: the "at the well" rule, which generally permits the deduction of post-production costs after the gas reaches the wellhead, and the "marketable product" approach, which generally does not permit deduction of post-production costs until the gas is in "marketable condition." Despite the fact that there are two general 8 approaches, the application of these approaches varies significantly between the jurisdictions. The most extreme approach to date has been adopted in West Virginia. One West Virginia court held that no post-production costs may be deducted from the wellhead to the point of sale, unless such costs and the methods for calculating those costs are explicitly stated in the lease. Until 9 recently, there was, essentially, no Pennsylvania royalty litigation, but Pennsylvania did have legislation governing royalties.
5.
See, e.g., HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS § R (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2009) (defining "royalty" as "the landowner's share of production, free of expenses of production").
6. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1156 
Pennsylvania Minimum Royalty Act
In 1979, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Minimum Royalty Act (the Act), which states: 10 A lease or other such agreement conveying the right to remove or recover oil, natural gas or gas of any other designation from lessor to lessee shall not be valid if such lease does not guarantee the lessor at least one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or recovered from the subject real property. 11 An oil, natural gas or other designation gas well or oil, natural gas or other designation gas lease which does not provide a one-eighth metered royalty shall be subject to such an escalation when its original state is altered by new drilling, deeper drilling, redrilling, artificial well stimulation, hydraulic fracturing or any other procedure for increased production. A lease shall not be affected when the well is altered through routine maintenance or cleaning.
12
Whenever such an increased production procedure has been completed prior to the effective date of this act, metering and the above royalty shall commence within 90 days after the effective date of this act. 13 From 1979 until recently, the Act was seldom addressed. In fact, there was only one published opinion concerning the Act, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in 1992 that held that the statute could not be applied retroactively so as to reform a pre-Act flat-rate lease to provide for a oneeighth royalty. A "flat-rate" lease is a lease that provides for a stated annual 14 royalty, e.g. $200 per year. Flat-rate leases are not tied to the volume of the oil or gas produced. Prior to the Act, flat-rate leases were common. After the Act was passed in 1979, the majority of leases provided for a royalty of one-eighth of production and many allowed for the deduction of certain expenses incurred after production.
Beginning in 2008, roughly 30 years after its enactment, the Act garnered significant attention. As was noted above, over 70 different lawsuits, involving hundreds of leases, were filed in state and federal courts in 10. Today, this Act goes by many names. In Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147 , it was referred to as the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act ("GMRA"). In reality, when the Act was passed in 1979 it was not named and it was not accompanied by any legislative history or discussion. See generally 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 33 (West 1996) ("An Act regulating the terms and conditions of certain leases regarding natural gas and oil.").
11 issue in all of the cases was the royalty owners' contention that any lease clause that explicitly or implicitly permits the deduction of post-production costs in the calculation of a royalty violates the Act and, as a result, rendered the lease void because the Act requires a guarantee of a minimum royalty of one-eighth. The lessors argued that they were entitled to one-eighth of the 16 proceeds of the gas without sharing in any of the costs of getting the gas to market.
17
In some of the early cases, the lessees sought to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in the leases that required the arbitration of all disputes arising under the leases. In response, the royalty owners' argued that the arbitration provisions did not apply because the leases containing the arbitration provisions were void. Despite that argument, arbitration was 18 compelled in some of the cases. In other early cases, federal judges refused 19 to consider the claims, invoking their discretionary power to decline to hear a declaratory judgment claim because the dispute involved a declaration of the meaning of a state statute that was never interpreted by the state courts.
20
A few cases did address the issue on the merits. In two cases decided by the same federal judge, the court denied the producer's motion to dismiss the royalty owners' claims in language that, while dicta, favored the plaintiffs' claim that the deductions lessened their royalty. In one case, the court 21 analyzed the following lease provision:
Lessee . . . shall pay the Lessor on gas, including casing head gas and other gaseous substances, produced and sold from the premises one-eighth (1/8th) of the amount realized from the sale of gas at the well (meaning the amount realized less all costs of gathering, transportation, compression, fuel, line loss and other post-production expenses incurred downstream of the wellhead). 
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The court stated that "[a]lthough the lease technically does provide for a guaranteed one-eighth royalty, it then proceeds to explain that costs will be deducted from that amount. The royalty then becomes less than one-eighth and a violation of the plain language of the statute." The federal court, however,
23
did not deny the motions to dismiss on that basis. Instead, the court found 24 that the term "royalty" was ambiguous because some jurisdictions permitted the deduction of post-production expenses while others, relying on the implied covenant of marketability, did not allow such deductions unless they were expressly agreed to in the lease. Because the court found the term "royalty" 25 to be ambiguous, it denied the motion to dismiss. 
The Kilmer Lease
The first claim to make its way to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the Kilmer case. That case involved whether a lease with the following 27 royalty provision violated the Act:
Lessor shall receive as its royalty one eighth (1/8th) of the sales proceeds, actually received by Lessee from the sale of such production, less this same percentage share of all Post Production Costs, as defined below, and this same percentage share of all production, severance and ad valorem taxes. As used in this provision, Post Production Costs shall mean (i) all losses of produced volumes (whether by use as fuel, line loss, flaring, venting or otherwise) and (ii) all costs actually incurred by Lessee from and after the wellhead to the point of sale, including, without limitation, all gathering, dehydration, compression, treatment, processing, marketing and transportation costs incurred in connection with the sale of such production.
28
The Kilmer case had an interesting, and relatively rare, journey through the court system. The case was initially heard in Pennsylvania's Court of Common Pleas, the trial court level. There, trial court granted the producer's motion for summary judgment. The lessors immediately appealed the 29 decision to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The lessee, however, asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to bypass the Superior Court by exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction and hearing the appeal. Act could impact the validity of thousands of leases, the Court's interpretation was critical to the state's oil and gas industry. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction and certified the following issue for immediate appeal: "whether the [Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act] precludes parties from contracting to use the net-back method to determine the royalties payable under an oil or natural gas lease." 
The Kilmer Decision
On March 24, 2010, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that a producer may deduct post-production costs in calculation of the minimum royalty required by the Act. The Kilmer court focused on the 33 provision of the Act that requires that oil and gas leases must guarantee the lessor "at least one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or recovered from the subject real property." As in the 34 other pending cases, the primary dispute between the lessors and the lessee was whether post-production costs that were incurred to process the gas and get it to the point of sale could be deducted from the proceeds of the sale of the gas prior to calculating the royalty. The lessors contended that such costs 35 had to be incurred solely by the producers and that the Act required a oneeighth royalty of the gross proceeds of sale. The producers argued that the 36 royalty was properly calculated as a share of the value of the gas at the wellhead, not the ultimate point of sale. The producers argued that post-37 production costs incurred must be deducted from the proceeds of sale before the one-eighth royalty was calculated, because the post-production activities, such as processing and transportation, increased the value of the gas as it lower courts when it deems a need to address an issue of immediate public importance. 42 PA. CONS. STAT 
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moved from the wellhead to the point of sale. This method of calculating a 38 royalty is known as the "net-back" method.
39
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with the producers and held that the Act "should be read to permit the calculation of royalties at the wellhead, as provided by the net-back method. . . ." Thus, the Kilmer court explicitly 40 adopted the definition of "royalty" that allows deduction of post-production costs. 41 Because of the Kilmer court's decision, it remains unsettled whether a lease that is found to be "invalid" under the Act is in fact void. Furthermore, there is no language in the Act or the legislative history that indicates the legislature intended to void leases; rather than, reform them to be "valid."
The Aftermath of Kilmer
After the Kilmer decision, not all of the pending claims disappeared. Plaintiffs have continued to prosecute their claims under the Act by seeking to distinguish their leases from the one analyzed in Kilmer. The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania decided several of these cases and, in each case, rejected claims seeking to distinguish specific leases from Kilmer. In an opinion analyzing three of the post-Kilmer claims, the federal court reviewed the leases' royalty provisions and explained that Kilmer was meant 43 to be read broadly, stating:
Though the essence of Plaintiff's argument is that Kilmer's holding should be narrowly applied, it is our view that Kilmer is properly read broadly in light of the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted extraordinary jurisdiction to resolve the purely legal question of whether post-production costs are proper under Pennsylvania oil and gas law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the more than seventy lawsuits, including the instant matters, pending in the Pennsylvania State and Federal Courts and the potential for stymied economic development when deciding to grant extraordinary jurisdiction to resolve this legal issue once and for all. Applying common sense to the matter, it is evident that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court surely considered that all of the leases that would be affected by their decision were not identical, thus their holding cannot be strictly applied only to leases that are on all fours to the lease in Kilmer. Such an application of Kilmer, or, rather, a non-application of Kilmer, defies both common sense and the concept of precedent. 44 45 43. The royalty provision as it appears in the Lauchle and Hooker cases provides the following: (B.) ROYALTY: It is agreed that the total Royalty that will be paid by Lessee shall be one eighth (1/8th) and that any Royalty conveyance or reservation in Lessor's chain of title shall be subtracted from the one eighth (1/8th) royalty provided herein. To pay lessor as Royalty, less all taxes, assessments, and adjustments on production from the Leasehold as follows: * * * 2. GAS: To pay Lessor an amount equal to one-eighth of the revenue realized by the Lessee for all gas and the constituents thereof produced and marketed from the Leasehold during the preceding month. Lessee may withhold Royalty payment until such time as the total withheld exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00). (B.) ROYALTY: To pay Lessor as Royalty, less all taxes, assessments, and adjustments and other permitted deductions on production from the Leasehold as follows: * * * 2. GAS: To pay Lessor an amount equal to one-eighth of the revenue realized by the Lessee for all gas and the constituents thereof produced and marketed from the Leasehold during the preceding month. It is agreed that the total Royalty that will be paid by Lessee shall be one-eighth (1/8th) and that any Royalty conveyance or reservation in Lessor's chain of title shall be subtracted from the one-eighth (1/8th) royalty provided herein. Lessee may withhold Royalty payment until such time as the total withheld exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00). "Revenue realized" shall mean the price received by Lessee for all oil, gas and constituents thereof produced and marketed from the Leasehold less any charges for transportation, dehydration, compression, and marketing paid by Lessee to deliver the oil, gas and constituents for sale. In addition to the federal opinions, one state court has followed the federal courts' lead and applied Kilmer broadly, even where the lease did not explicitly spell out what deductions were permitted.
Royalty Claims
Although Kilmer resolved how to apply the Act, it did not address the issue of what costs may be deducted under a specific lease, especially if the lease simply provides for a calculation "at the well" or "at the wellhead." The Kilmer court noted that it was not faced with that issue, inasmuch as the lease at issue in Kilmer explicitly delineated the post-production costs to be deducted. 46 Unsurprisingly, the second theory being tested by lessors concerns how deductions were taken. To date, these claims have involved class actions which seek declaratory relief and damages due to the lessors' claims that certain deductions, especially those involving volumetric deductions and affiliate transactions, were not permitted or were improperly calculated. One of those cases has already been settled, while others remain pending. 45. We cannot imagine that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after granting expedited consideration and jurisdiction, meant to render a holding so narrow as to invite its consideration of myriad other cases involving leases that were not entirely identical to the Kilmer lease. We empathize with Plaintiffs' desire to escape what they consider to be bad bargains. But they have put too fine a point on Kilmer in aid of voiding their leases. Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and this Court, recognize the need for finality. A holding contrary to the one we render today would trigger havoc in a multi-billion dollar industry. More importantly, it would be in error.
It is our considered view that the Kilmer Court did not make their holding so narrow as to only apply to the lease at issue in Kilmer. Thus, we find, despite Plaintiffs' protestations to the contrary, that it is precisely not the holding of Kilmer that post-production costs must be divided into one-eighths born by the Lessor and seven-eights born by the Lessee for the lease to be valid. Nor do the post-production deductions provided for in the leases need to be identical to the Kilmer deductions to be valid. The holding of Kilmer is that the GMRA permits the calculation of the royalties at the wellhead utilizing the net-back method. That is exactly what the leases here provide, and as a result, we decline to void them. In Pollock v. Energy Corp. of America, a class action was filed alleging that Energy Corp. took impermissible volumetric deductions in calculating the lessors' gas royalties, used the incorrect price of gas sold when calculating the lessors' gas royalties, took improper deductions when calculating the lessors' gas royalties and either failed to, or insufficiently paid, the lessors' oil royalties. After an extensive discussion of the Kilmer case, the court noted 49 that Energy Corp. advocated for an "expansive reading of Kilmer," applying the net-back method to all oil and gas leases, "regardless of whether a lease describes the particulars of the post-production costs that can be deducted from the gross sales price." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, "argue[d] that 50 because the leases at issue, unlike those dissected in Kilmer, do not specifically provide for a deduction for lost gas from the royalty, [Energy Corp.] breached the leases when it did not pay royalties on that category of gas." The court, however, citing a prior federal decision, rejected the ) (refusing plaintiff's argument that the Kilmer decision did not apply due to variances between the Kilmer lease and the lease at issue, and stating that "Kilmer was not meant to be read narrowly" and therefore "the deduction of post-production costs contained in the lease . . . is a permissible use of the net-back method under the GRMA"). 
II. LEASING RIGHTS ISSUES
In addition to claims by royalty owners, increased litigation over who owns the rights to the exploration and development of the Marcellus Shale and whether any lease ever existed or was terminated resulted from the development of Marcellus Shale.
A. Lease Formation Claims
A number of cases have dealt with the issue of contract formation. In several federal cases, whether the landowners' signing of the lease agreement constituted an offer or an acceptance was the central issue before the court.
59
One such case is Lyco Better Homes, where the landowner signed leases that contained a provision stating that the agreement was subject to management and title approval. Months later, the producer sent a letter to the 60 landowner stating that the leases were not approved by senior management, and thus were void. The landowner sued for breach of contract. The 61 producer responded by arguing that the landowner's signing of the lease was merely an offer, which the producer could accept or reject, and that no contract was ever formed. Thus, the producer claimed proper use of its right The court also determined that the lease did not meet the requirements imposed by the statute of frauds because "[a]lthough [the landowners] contend that [the producer] informed plaintiffs of the lease approval via a telephone call . . . in Pennsylvania, leases which will exceed three years must be in writing in order to be enforceable." 65 In Hollingsworth, a case with similar facts, the court dismissed the landowner's claim on grounds that "[n]o contract could be formed absent [the producer's] manifestation of an intent to be bound." There, the court 66 determined that the producer's preparation of the lease agreement did not amount to an offer because:
[a] . . . manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed [the landowner] knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent [i.e., communicating management and title approval]. 67 The court ultimately held that the landowners claim failed because "they have alleged no further facts indicating an unconditional promise" by the producers since the producer's entrance into the agreement was "conditioned . . . upon management review." 68 A different result was reached in a third similar case, in which the landowners alleged a breach of contract action against the producer for its failure to pay them royalty and bonus payments. In Valentino, the 69 landowners contended that they chose to sign a lease with the producer after they were offered a large bonus payment of $485,800.00, despite being approached by various other producers to negotiate a lease. They argued that 70 they were to receive the payment unless the producer surrendered the lease within ninety days. After the ninety days had elapsed, the landowners 71 contacted the producer and the producer responded via letter that the lease had not been approved by its management and was not binding on either party.
72
In response to the claim filed by the landowners, the producer filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the federal district court had granted motions to dismiss in both the Lyco and Hollingsworth cases, which were factually analogous. In response, the court held that it was not bound by the decision 73 of another district court and that it could freely reconsider the issues and 74 denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the landowners' allegations were sufficient to plead a breach of contract case. District cases each granted a motion to dismiss where Plaintiff did not meet the scienter requirement of fraudulent inducement by failing to allege that defendant or their agents knew statements made were false, or recklessly disregarded the truth in making those statements. 82 Recently, in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, the defendants requested a declaratory judgment that a mineral reservation included Marcellus shale gas. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in considering an appeal of an 83 order on preliminary objections, began its analysis by citing Pennsylvania precedent over 100 years old regarding the definition of the term "mineral." 84 Although that ancient precedent stated that " [t] he cardinal test of the meaning of any word in any particular case is the intent of the parties using it," it was 85 also stated that the term, "presumably is intended in the ordinary popular sense which it bears among English speaking people." However, when used 86 in the context of land conveyances, the term "may include any inorganic substance found in nature having sufficient value separated from its situs as part of the earth to be mined, quarried, or dug for its own sake or its own specific uses." The Butler court, nonetheless, cited multiple Pennsylvania 87 cases finding that the word "minerals" does not include natural gas or oil. 88 Despite this compilation of case law, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded the trial court's decision that the reservation of minerals did not include Marcellus shale gas. The court reasoned that further 89 analysis was necessary as to whether Marcellus shale was a "mineral," whether Marcellus shale gas is the same kind of natural gas contemplated in the prior case law, and whether Marcellus shale is similar to coal in that the owner of the Shale is also the owner of the Shale gas.
This further analysis 90 91
will be illuminating, as due to the procedural posture of the case the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has, in actuality, simply returned the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
B. Lease Termination Claims
Another area where the Pennsylvania courts have became involved, deals with issues of who owns the right to explore and produce. Two cases from the same federal court construing the same lease language reached opposite conclusions as to who owned the right to explore for and produce native natural gas in formations above and below a natural gas storage field. The 92 leases in both cases granted the lessee the right to produce and store natural gas and provided that their term would continue so long as gas was stored or produced. The lessee had used the properties for decades for storage, but had 93 never explored for native gas in any other zone. The lessor then entered into 94 a top-lease with another producer and sought to invalidate the combination storage and production lease. In the first case, the federal court held that the 95 original lessee had abandoned production rights under the lease and that it had breached an implied covenant to develop the property. In the second case, 96 the same issue was decided, but with regard to many additional leases within two storage fields. In the second case, the federal court held that the lease meant what it said, i.e. the lease would remain in effect so long as the property was used for storage or production. In the face of the parties' explicit 97 description whatsoever'" included sandstone extracted for commercial purposes. The PAPCO court also cited Silver and Highland, but, similar to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Butler, found that sandstone was not excluded from the mineral reservation. PAPCO, at *16. Additionally, in Hoffman v. Acrelormittal Pristine Resources, Inc., No. 11-CV-0322, 2011 WL 1791709, at *3 (May 10, 2011 W.D. Pa.), plaintiff argued that the term "all gas" in a deed "means only gas that is 'contained within the sandstone strata underlying the subject land.'" Plaintiff supported this argument with the notion that because Marcellus shale gas was not an economically viable source for natural gas at the time of the deed (1928), the parties could not have intended to convey that gas. Id. The court, however, relying on the presence of the word "all," was not swayed by Plaintiff's argument. Id. at *4, *6. The Hoffman court also found that the Plaintiff had not adversely possessed the mineral interests, as there had been no "actual possession, meaning drilling and production [] agreement, the doctrines of abandonment and implied covenant to develop had no application. A number of cases have addressed fact specific issues regarding the continuation of leases. For example, in the Sylvester case, a federal court refused to invalidate a lease because the production had tendered the up-front payment 23 days late, holding that the breach was not material where the lease did not state that "time was of the essence" and the royalty owner had not given notice and an opportunity to cure. In another lease validity decision, 98 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear a decision by the Superior Court and upheld the validity of a 1928 lease which provided that it remained in effect so long as gas was produced in "paying quantities." The court held that the test for "paying quantities" was a subjective test and that the producer's determination would govern so long as it was made in good faith and not solely for the purpose of holding the land for speculative purposes. 99 In Hite v. Falcon Partners, the court addressed the payment of delay rentals to extend lease terms. There, defendant was assigned numerous 100 leases, each with: one year terms, delay rentals of $2 per acre, and no habendum clause. Defendant utilized this anachronistic lease structure to
